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updates from the international and
internationalized criminal courts and tribunals
International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia
Stalling Tactics or Due Process?
The Karadzic Trail Resumes
On April 8, 2010, the trial of Radovan
Karadzic resumed after the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo
slavia (ICTY) rejected Karadzic’s plea
stating, “The chamber is not satisfied
that there has been any violation of the
accused’s right to a fair trial which would
justify a stay of the proceedings.” The trial
was initially set to resume on March 1,
2010 after a five-month postponement, but
was adjourned the very next day, pending
a decision by the Appellate Chambers on
Karadzic’s appeal of a prior Trial Court
decision to reject his plea for postponement. A plea of not guilty was submitted
on Karadzic’s behalf to the ICTY on March
3, after Karadzic failed to submit one on
his own behalf. During the second week of
the trial’s resumption, the prosecution will
start to present witness testimony for the
first time.
The former Bosnian Serb leader is
charged with genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity, committed during
the 1992-95 conflict in Bosnia. Karadzic is
widely regarded as the architect of some of
the worst atrocities since World War II and
is blamed, among other things, for the siege
of Sarajevo and the attack on Srebrenica.
Known as the Karadzic war, the attack
on Srebrenica took the lives of over 8,000
Bosnian Muslim boys and men. The siege
of Sarajevo lasted 44 months, and death
toll estimates range as high as 10,000
people, with 56,000 wounded. Responding
to these charges, Karadzic has claimed that
the Western narrative of these events is
biased, and has called the Serb role in the
conflict “just and holy.”
Karadzic was arrested and transferred
to the ICTY in 2008, and his trial was
initially set to take place in July of that
year. After several postponements, the
trial began in November 2009, but was
again postponed after Karadzic boycotted
the proceedings. In a letter to the Court,
Karadzic stated that his decision to exer-

cise his right to self-representation and the
subsequent difficulties that accompanied
his decision should not negatively impact
the fairness of his trial and his time to fully
prepare. Standby counsel was appointed
by the Court and afforded five months, till
March 1, 2010, to prepare for the trial.
The trial has been anticipated as a
means of exposing long-hidden truths,
among them the inadequate response of
UN peacekeepers, who had information
before the Serbian attack on Srebrenica.
Others have hailed the trial as a means
of lifting the shroud of secrecy that has
masked the systematic and brutal killing
and mistreatment of Bosnian Muslims in
Sarajevo. Perhaps most important, the trial
should present the opportunity for the victims of these atrocities to be heard.
“Everything the Serbs did is being
treated as a crime,” Karadzic said during
his opening statement before the court
in March. Karadzic described attacks by
Bosnian Muslims and stated that Bosnian
Serbs’ actions were a response to these
attacks and only aimed at military forces.
Karadzic further stated that the siege of
Sarajevo was a myth “aimed at drawing
NATO into the conflict on the side of
Bosnian Muslims.” While Karadzic claims
to be preparing the truth about Srebrenica
and the other allegations, victims of these
events have stated that he deserves a
“Nobel Prize for lying.” Despite Karadzic’s
multiple opportunities to tell his side of the
story, no witnesses reached the stand at any
prior hearing. With the recommencement
of the trial, the Court and the public will
finally hear victims’ voices. The telling of
the war’s stories, both those of the victims
and those of Karadzic, is the chance for
truths to come out, and perhaps, for some
of the wounds to begin to heal.
Anna Maitland, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law and an Articles Editor for the
Human Rights Brief, wrote this column on
the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia.
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International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda
Muvunyi Verdict
On February 11, 2009, Trial Chamber
III of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) handed down a reduced
sentence of fifteen years to Tharcisse
Muvunyi for direct and public incitement
to commit genocide. The amended judgment came from a retrial of a hearing on
September 12, 2006, when Trial Chamber
II sentenced Muvunyi to 25 years in prison
for acts of genocide as well as public
incitement to commit genocide and other
inhumane acts.
From 1994 until his departure from
Rwanda, Muvunyi was the commander of
the School of Non-Commissioned Officers
(ESO). Based in the Butare Prefecture,
he was the highest placed military officer
in charge of security operations for both
the prefecture of Butare and Gunkogoro.
While serving at this post, Muvunyi
accompanied the then-interim President
Théodore Sinidikubwabo to the investiture
ceremony for the new regional administrator. There, Sinidikubwabo made an inflammatory speech inciting the killing of Tutsis.
During Muvunyi’s ICTR hearing, the prosecution argued that because Muvunyi and
others did not at that point disassociate
themselves from Sinidikubwabo, they sent
a message of approval. Muvunyi himself
then purportedly went on to incite a series
of groups to kill Tutsis.
The Prosecution alleged that Muvunyi,
who was in charge of ensuring the safety
of civilians, did not ensure Tutsis’ safety,
but rather he and others “fomented, encouraged, facilitated and/or approved amongst
other things, the murders, abductions and
destruction of property by the Interahamwe
and the military.” Additionally, Muvunyi
was also said to have direct involvement
in the supply and transportation of arms
meant for the perpetration of attacks on
Tutsis. He has also been accused of murdering two religious leaders and attacking
several important buildings, including the
University of Butare and its hospital, the
dispensary at Matyaro, the Market Square
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in Kibilizi, and several others. There are
also reports that many women and girls
were raped during the attacks. Muvunyi
directly ordered many of these attacks
and, though he knew about other attacks
because of his rank and position, he took
no steps to prevent them from occurring. Yet, despite the mounting allegations
from the Prosecution, the ICTR refused to
uphold the charge for acts of genocide.
On February 5, 2000, Muvunyi was
arrested and transported to the ICTR.
Six years later, on September 12, 2006,
Muvunyi received his guilty verdict and
was sentenced to 25 years in prison. On
August 29, 2008, the Appeals Chamber
set aside all convictions and the previous
sentence, ordering a retrial on one charge
of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. The indictment alleges that
Muvunyi spoke at a meeting at the Gikore
Centre in 1994 and incited the killing of
Tutsis. The retrial recommenced on July
17, 2009, and on February 11, 2010, the
Tribunal found Muvunyi guilty of direct
and public incitement to commit genocide,
sentencing him to fifteen years in prison,
with the five years he has already served
credited to his term.
Shahroo Yazdani, a J.D. candidate at
the American University Washington
College of Law, wrote this column on
the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda for the Human Rights Brief.

Judgment Summary: The Prosecutor
v. Hormisdas Nsengimana, Case No.
ICTR-01-69-T
On November 17, 2009, the ICTR
Trial Chamber I issued its judgment in
Prosecutor v. Hormisdas Nsengimana. The
Prosecutor had charged Nsengimana, a
Catholic priest and Rector of the Collège
Christ-Roi during the Rwandan genocide,
with charges of genocide, conspiracy to
commit genocide, and murder and extermination as crimes against humanity. The
Chamber acquitted Nsengimana on all
charges.
Nsengimana was arrested at a monastery in Cameroon in March 2002 and
transferred to the Tribunal the following
month. He quickly pled not guilty, and
his trial commenced on June 22, 2007.
The trial concluded on September 17,
2008 after testimony by nineteen witnesses for the Prosecution and 24, including Nsengimana, for the Defense.

The allegations against Nsengimana
included individual criminal responsibility
— through planning, instigating, ordering,
committing, and aiding and abetting —
for the killing of Tutsi priests, students,
women, children, refugees, and a judge
between April 6 and May 31, 1994. In
addition, Nsengimana was charged on the
theory of superior responsibility for the
genocidal acts of employees and students
at the Collège as well as members of Les
Dragons, or Escadrons de la Mort, a band
of Hutu extremists in Nyanza for whom the
priest was alleged to have been a spiritual
advisor.
The Chamber quickly disposed of the
charge of superior responsibility, finding the evidence insufficient to establish
Nsengimana’s effective control over students and staff at Collège Christ-Roi during
the genocide. Notably, the Chamber found
that Nsengimana did hold de jure authority
over the Collège community. However, noting the “vital role” played by other civilian
superiors who were deemed responsible
for the acts of the principal perpetrators
of the relevant crimes, the Chamber found
the priest’s de jure authority insufficient
by itself to establish effective control.
Moreover, although he met frequently with
members of Collège staff known to have
committed a number of killings, the evidence failed to prove that Nsengimana
exercised sufficient control over these staff
members to support a finding of de facto
authority. The Chamber also found no
direct evidence of the priest’s “spiritual
authority” over any of the assailants during
the course of the killings in April and May
1994. Thus, the Prosecution failed to prove
that Nsengimana was responsible for the
actions of his students or staff.
With regard to the accused’s alleged
direct responsibility for genocide, the
Prosecutor charged that Nsengimana was
involved in both planning and carrying
out genocidal acts. With respect to planning, the Prosecution alleged that, between
1990 and May 1994, Nsengimana met
with Hutu extremists implicated in the
killing of Tutsis in April and May 1994
and that, by virtue of his role as spiritual
advisor to these Hutus, the accused played
a prominent role in planning the genocidal
acts. However, the Chamber found insufficient evidence to support finding beyond
a reasonable doubt that the accused participated in such meetings. The Chamber also
found insufficient evidence to support the
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Prosecution’s allegation that Nsengimana
played a role in stockpiling machetes at the
Collège between 1991 and April 1994.
With regard to the accused’s participation in acts of genocide in April and May
1994, the Prosecution specifically alleged
that the priest was involved in: (1) the
killing by several Collège employees of a
number of Tutsi civilians in the Mugonzi
cellule following a meeting at or near the
Collège on May 3, 1994; (2) the removal
of three Tutsi priests from an orphanage
in Nyanza on May 4 and their subsequent
murder at a roadblock; (3) the abduction
and murder of Xavérine and her son from
the École Normale Primaire; (4) the killing of Callixte Kayitsinga, a Tutsi who
sought refuge at the Collège, by a Collège
employee, Phénéas Munyarubuga; (5) the
killing of Judge Jean-Baptiste Twagirayezu
behind the Nyanza parish church immediately after he left Collège Christ-Roi;
and (6) the abduction and murder of Tutsi
civilians, including eight children, from
the Don Bosco orphanage on May 22. The
Trial Chamber found that the perpetrators intentionally killed Tutsis in each of
these episodes and that the perpetrators
intended to destroy the Tutsi group in
whole or in substantial part. However, the
Chamber also found no credible evidence
to support the Prosecutor’s allegations that
Nsengimana planned, ordered, instigated,
or committed these attacks. The Chamber
noted that “[w]hile [Nsengimana] was seen
on occasion in the company of local government or security officials at roadblocks,
these sightings do not compel the conclusion that he invariably supported any of the
killings charged against him.”
On the second and third counts of the
Indictment — murder and extermination as
crimes against humanity — the Prosecutor
relied on the same events as above. Again,
the Chamber found ample proof that the
widespread killings of Tutsi in Nyanza,
Butare prefecture, and Rwanda more generally in April and May 1994 constituted
crimes against humanity. But the evidence
again failed to establish Nsengimana’s
criminal liability for any of the killings.
The priest’s acquittal was announced a
day after another prominent alleged genocidaire was also acquitted. The decisions
sparked immediate protests and accusations of “malpractice” and lax efforts by
the Prosecution from victims’ advocates in
Kigali. In late March 2010, Nsengimana
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was transferred out of East Africa; once
more a free man, he has resumed pastoral
duties in a village in northern Italy.
Cyrena Khoury, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, wrote this
judgment summary for the Human Rights
Brief. Susana SáCouto, Director of the War
Crimes Research Office, and Katherine
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War
Crimes Research Office, edited this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

Sentencing Judgment Summary: The
Prosecutor v. Michel Bagaragaza,
Case No. ICTR 05-86-T
On November 5, 2009, ICTR Trial
Chamber III sentenced Michel Bagaragaza
to eight years in prison, with a credit
for time already served. The Chamber
imposed the sentence after accepting a plea
bargain on September 17, 2009, through
which Bagaragaza agreed to plead guilty
to complicity in genocide.
Bagaragaza was born in 1945 in
the commune of Giciye in the Gisenyi
Prefecture of Rwanda. Before the genocide
began in April 1994, he was a member of
Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour
le Développement (MRND), the Rwandan
political party led by President Juvenal
Habyarimana. Bagaragaza was also a
member of the Akazu, a group of powerful Rwandans who formed Habyarimana’s
inner circle. As a result of his political connections, Bagaragaza was chosen to direct
the Rwandan Tea Authority, an industry
comprised of eleven tea factories and over
55,000 workers.
Bagaragaza was initially indicted by the
ICTR on three counts: conspiracy to commit genocide; genocide; and complicity in
genocide as an alternative to the second
count. He voluntarily surrendered to the
ICTR on August 15, 2005 and, at his initial
appearance before the Tribunal, pled not
guilty to each of the charges. He was then
transferred to the detention facility of the
ICTY in The Hague due to security problems arising from his decision to voluntarily surrender. On February 13, 2006, the
Prosecutor moved to transfer Bagaragaza’s
trial to Norway pursuant to Rule 11bis of
the ICTR’s Rules of Procure, which allows
a Trial Chamber “to refer a case to a competent national jurisdiction for trial if it
is satisfied that the accused will receive
a fair trial and that the death penalty will
not be imposed or carried out.” However,

the Chamber presiding over Bagaragaza’s
case denied the motion on the ground that
Norway did not have any provision against
genocide in its domestic criminal law. On
April 13, 2007, the Chamber granted a
motion for the trial to be transferred to the
Netherlands, but rescinded its approval just
days later on the advice of the Netherlands’
justice ministry, which had cast doubt on
whether its courts could successfully try
the case. Finally, days before Bagaragaza’s
trial was to commence before the ICTR,
the Prosecutor and Defense reached a plea
agreement in which Bagaragaza would
plead to complicity in genocide, and submitted it to the Trial Chamber.
In the plea agreement, Bagaragaza
admitted that he “substantially contributed
to the massacre of more than one thousand
members of the Tutsi ethnic group who had
sought refuge at Kesho Hill, in the Kabaya
area, and at Nyundo Cathedral in Gisenyi
préfecture.” Specifically, after meeting
with MRND leaders who advocated committing genocide against Tutsis and sympathetic Hutus in April 1994, Bagaragaza
directed his subordinates to stockpile
weapons and other supplies in several tea
factories. Bagaragaza also arranged for a
local Interahamwe chapter to be trained
and equipped in Gisenyi prefecture. After
the outbreak of violence, Bagaragaza provided additional assistance to a number of
other Interahamwe units, repeatedly directing his subordinates to give Interahamwe
members fuel and vehicles from factory
stockpiles in order to enable them to commit genocidal acts against the Tutsis taking refuge at Kesho Hill and Nyundo
Cathedral. Bagaragaza also directed his
subordinates to supply the Interahamwe
with alcohol in order to encourage individual members to continue their attacks
in other regions.
As reviewed by the Trial Chamber, the
jurisprudence of the ICTR has defined
complicity in genocide as aiding and abetting, instigating, or procuring acts of genocide. While acts constituting aiding and
abetting may occur at the planning, preparation, or execution stage of the crime,
or after the act of the principal offender,
the accomplice must carry out an act of
“substantial practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support to the principal
offender, culminating in the latter’s actual
commission of the crime.” Thus, although
the assistance “need not be indispensable
to the crime, it must have a substantial
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effect on the commission of the crime.” In
terms of mens rea, complicity by aiding
and abetting requires only that the accomplice was aware of the specific genocidal
intent of the principal perpetrators; it is
not necessary that the accomplice himself
shared that genocidal intent.
Based on the admissions of Bagaragaza
in the plea agreement submitted by the
parties, the Trial Chamber determined that
he substantially assisted the killings of
more than 1,000 Tutsis in Gisenyi, with
the knowledge of the perpetrators’ intent,
and thus the Chamber accepted the plea
agreement. It then went on to determine an
appropriate sentence based on the gravity
of the crime and aggravating and mitigating factors. First, the Chamber acknowledged that the crime of genocide is particularly heinous and repugnant within
human society. However, the Chamber
cited evidence that Bagaragaza did not personally plan or execute any of the attacks,
and did not share the genocidal intent held
by the MRND and Interahamwe members
whom he assisted. Second, the Chamber
noted that the Prosecutor did not enter any
aggravating factors into the record. Third,
the Chamber discussed a variety of mitigating factors. For instance, Bagaragaza
had not shown any personal animosity or
bias towards Tutsis before the outbreak of
violence. He did not refuse to engage in
business dealings with Tutsis, and he had
two children with a Tutsi mother who he
sheltered throughout the genocide. Also,
as mentioned before, his actions were
not motivated by an intention to commit
genocide against the Tutsis. Instead, the
Chamber found it more likely that he acted
out of concern for the safety of his family.
Additional mitigating factors to which the
Chamber gave credence were the fact that
Bagaragaza voluntarily surrendered, confessed to the crime of complicity in genocide, and demonstrated remorse for his
role in the genocide. Lastly, the Chamber
gave significant weight to Bagaragaza’s
commitment to cooperating with the
Prosecutor, noting that Bagaragaza had
agreed to provide the Prosecutor with
information about other responsible parties and had testified for the Prosecution
in the trial against Protais Zigiranyirazo,
President Habyarimana’s brother-in-law.
In addition to the gravity of the offense
and aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the Chamber recognized that its
sentence must comport with goals of pun-
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ishment such as retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and protection of society. In
light of the severity of the crime of genocide, the Chamber was primarily concerned
with the first two goals. Furthermore, it
found that rehabilitation and protection
of society were less important because
Bagaragaza was an elderly family man who
expressed remorse in his actions. Finally,
the Chamber considered sentences handed
down in past cases from the ICTR and the
ICTY.
The Prosecutor and Defense jointly
submitted a sentence recommendation of
six-to-ten years in prison. Although the
Chamber noted that it was not required to
abide by the recommendation, it ultimately
followed the joint recommendation by sentencing Bagaragaza to eight years in prison.
Paul Rinefierd, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this judgment summary for
the Human Rights Brief. Susana SáCouto,
Director of the War Crimes Research
Office, and Katherine Anne Cleary,
Assistant Director of the War Crimes
Research Office, edited this summary for
the Human Rights Brief.

International Criminal Court
ICC Prosecutor Initiates Investigation
of Election Violence in Kenya
On March 31, the International
Criminal Court (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber
II authorized the Prosecutor’s investigation into the 2007 post-election violence in
Kenya that resulted in over 1,100 deaths,
hundreds of rapes, and the displacement
of at least 350,000 people. Though the
Kenyan government chose not to refer the
situation to the ICC, the Prosecutor has
gathered enough facts to support a reasonable basis for the belief that crimes against
humanity were committed in the weeks
following Kenya’s 2007 presidential election. This marks the first time that the ICC
Prosecutor has personally referred a situation to the ICC for an investigation, instead
of a referral from the UN Security Council
or a State Party to the Rome Statute.
After the victory of the incumbent,
Mwai Kibaki, in Kenya’s December 2007
presidential election, civil unrest broke out
as ethnic Luo supporters of his opponent,
Raila Odinga, accused Kibaki and his
ethnic Kikuyu support base of corruption.
Violence between the Kikuyu and Luo

tribes escalated, until Kibaki and Odinga
opted to form a unity government at the
urging of former UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan. Though the new administration intended to establish a tribunal to prosecute those who organized and financed
the violence, Kenya’s parliament failed to
conduct a successful vote to establish such
a tribunal. Meanwhile, throughout 2008,
the ICC Prosecutor collected a great deal
of information from human rights workers,
journalists, and diplomats about what had
occurred. While visiting Kenya to speak
with President Kibaki and Prime Minister
Odinga in November 2009, the Prosecutor
expressed his intention to refer the situation to the ICC through his authority under
Article 15 of the Rome Statute to refer
situations proprio motu. He filed his 1,500page request on November 26.
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s three-judge
panel approved the Prosecutor’s request
on March 31 in a two-to-one decision. The
majority found that the facts provided by
the Prosecutor met the low “reasonable
basis for belief ” standard of proof required
to approve an investigation, agreeing that
he had established a reasonable basis to
believe that the widespread, systematic,
and ethnically-based targeting of victims
by well-organized groups may constitute
crimes against humanity. However, dissenting Judge Hans-Peter Kaul did not agree
that the incidents could amount to crimes
against humanity. Specifically, Judge Kaul
did not find that the suspected parties acted
as a “state” or pursuant to any state-like
“organizational policy” as specified in
Article 7(2)(a) of the Statute, and therefore, they could not be investigated under
the ICC’s jurisdiction.
Following the March 31 decision, the
Prosecutor submitted a list of twenty suspects to the Pre-Trial Chamber, but the
names have yet to be publically released.
The list includes prominent businessmen
and politicians, some currently in office,
who are accused of funding and orchestrating the crimes. Kenyan Justice Minister
Mutula Kilonzo welcomed the investigation, and some politicians suspected of
involvement in the violence have expressed
their willingness to face the Court.
Chris Valvardi, a J.D. candidate at
the American University Washington
College of Law, wrote this column on
the International Criminal Court for the
Human Rights Brief.
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ICC Judge Orders Release of
Intermediary’s Identity
On March 15, 2010, the ICC Judge
Adrian Fulford ordered the identity of an
intermediary be disclosed to the defense,
an event that may help Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo’s defense team refute testimony of
prosecution witnesses regarding Lubanga’s
involvement in recruiting child soldiers.
Lubanga, according to the Prosecution,
was a Union des Patriotes Congolais
(UPC) leader in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, and is accused of conscripting
children under the age of fifteen years
into armed groups, enlisting children into
armed groups and using children to participate actively in armed conflict. His
trial, the first-ever before the ICC, began
on January 26, 2008. The intermediary
in question is accused of bribing various
people in the town of Bunia to falsely
implicate Lubanga. The order to release
the intermediary’s identity came after the
defense’s tenth witness had testified behind
closed doors.
According to the Head of the
Jurisdiction
Complementarity
and
Cooperation Division of the Office of
the Prosecutor (OTP), Béatrice Le Fraper
du Hellen, “Intermediaries are people in
the field who put the OTP in contact
with potential sources and witnesses, and
describe to the OTP the situation on the
ground.” Suggesting they are rarely used
in trial proceedings, she further stated that
intermediaries are not investigators and are
never called as witnesses. The Prosecution
says it is in the process of appealing this
ruling. The Prosecution’s Mahoj Sachdeva
said the disclosure would have “grave consequences in terms of the potential safety
of our intermediaries.”
On March 17, the Defense called a
former Prosecution witness, who admitted
to the Court last June that he fabricated
testimony. Referred to as “Witness 15,” he
stated that an intermediary encouraged him
to lie before he talked to OTP investigators.
Reports are unclear as to whether it is the
same intermediary whose identity is to be
released. In 2005, “Witness 15” told investigators that military training camps run by
the UPC indoctrinated children as young as
twelve years old and that he frequently saw
UPC commanders go to the UPC headquarters to meet with Lubanga. However,
he then recanted, stating that he was never
a soldier and never saw UPC commanders
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meet with Lubanga. His testimony continued into the following week.
This evidence and the release of the
intermediary’s identity are part of the
Defense’s overall strategy to prove that
Prosecution witnesses knowingly testified
to false information with the encouragement of intermediaries. According to its
opening statement on January 27, 2010,
the Defense hopes the Court will stop the
case due to abuse of process. However, if
the case continues, the Defense will argue
that Lubanga “did not take deliberate part
in the common plan to recruit minors” and
that he attempted to demobilize the minors
who had joined the Patriotic Forces for the
Liberation of Congo.
John Coleman, a J.D. candidate at
the American University Washington
College of Law, wrote this column on
the International Criminal Court for the
Human Rights Brief.

Sudan’s President May Still Face
Charges of Genocide
In March 2009, the ICC issued its
first arrest warrant for a sitting head of
state, approving the Prosecutor’s application for the arrest of Sudanese President
Omar al-Bashir on charges arising out
of the situation in Darfur. The charges
initially brought against Bashir included
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide; however, the Pre-Trial Chamber
originally rejected the counts of genocide
proposed by the Prosecutor. Recently, the
Appeals Chamber determined that those
counts were rejected under an incorrect

legal standard, and directed the Pre-Trial
Chamber to re-examine the possibility of
holding Bashir accountable for state-sponsored genocide. As yet, no date has been
set for the Pre-Trial Chamber to revisit
the issue. The decision puts further weight
behind efforts to bring Bashir before the
Court and further refines the ICC’s threshold for attributing genocidal intent to highranking government leaders.
The UN Security Council’s referral of
the Darfur situation to the ICC through
Resolution 1593 did not explicitly address
the subject of genocide; however, the
Prosecutor’s July 2008 warrant application
tied a large number of crimes against the
residents of Darfur to genocidal intent at
the highest levels of the Sudanese government. The warrant application listed three
counts of genocide among the ten counts
against Bashir, noting that he used the
state apparatus to kill members of three
targeted non-Arab ethnic groups; to inflict
serious physical and mental harm through
rape, torture, and displacement; and to
deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to destroy those groups. To meet the
“reasonable grounds” standard required for
issuance of a warrant under Article 58 of
the Rome Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber
has to infer genocidal intent from the facts
produced by the investigation.
Despite the Prosecutor’s efforts, the
Pre-Trial Chamber decided to issue the
initial arrest warrant without the genocide counts. The Chamber explained that,
although the results of the investigation
may have supported counts of genocide,
those results could also support various
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other inferences, and did not conclusively
establish the reasonable likelihood of genocidal intent. The Prosecutor requested and
received permission to appeal this decision
in order to resolve uncertainty as to the
standard of proof.
Subsequently, the Appeals Chamber
held that the Pre-Trial Chamber acted
erroneously in basing its rejection of the
genocide counts on the grounds that genocide was not the only possible conclusion.
The Chamber distinguished the Article 58
“reasonable grounds for belief ” standard
from higher standards necessary to confirm charges or obtain a conviction. The
Appeals Chamber found that the Pre-Trial
Chamber’s reasoning too closely approximated the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard required for conviction, rather than
the less restrictive “reasonable grounds”
standard for the issuance of the arrest warrant.
The Appeals Chamber did not go so
far as to approve the addition of the genocide counts, instead remanding the case to
the Pre-Trial Chamber. Meanwhile, Bashir
received overwhelming support in Sudan’s
presidential elections in April — the country’s first democratic elections in 24 years
— primarily because the major opposition party in Southern Sudan boycotted
the election and hundreds of thousands of
Darfurians are not registered voters.
Chris Valvardi, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of
Law, wrote this column on the International
Criminal Court for the Human Rights
Brief.		
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